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ABSTRACT
In this paper we study the production and dissemination of public knowledge goods –
such as technological knowledge – generated by a network of voluntarily cooperating
innovators. We develop a private-collective model of public knowledge production in
networked innovation systems, where group-based social preferences have an impact
on the coalition formation of developers. Our model builds on the large empiri-
cal literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including
source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access
data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences such
as ‘group belonging’ or ‘peer approval’ influence the stable coalition size, as such
rationalising several stylised facts emerging from large scale surveys of open-source
software developers, previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of so-
cial preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable, but mixed
coalitions.
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1. Introduction
From the seminal work of Powell et al. (1996), a growing debate over the link between
the process of innovation and social network formation has taken an important place
in the literature on applied sciences.1 More precisely, this literature has started to dis-
tinguish between innovation driven by collaborative relationships, as opposed to more
competitive and market-based arrangements (Swan and Scarbrough 2005; Hardy et al.
2003). Along these lines, Phillips et al. (2000) suggest that “networked innovation” of
this kind relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control, but occurs
through more horizontal relationships negotiated in communicative processes. Simi-
larly, Abdirahman et al. (2014) consider networked innovation as intentional, inter-
organizational and inter-individual relationships oriented to knowledge creation. Sie
et al. (2009) lastly, describe how a network of organisations – or individuals within or-
ganisations – will profit from each other’s complementary knowledge by cooperatively
sharing information or assets. The resulting partnerships between agents and/or or-
ganisations – formed by cooperatively sharing knowledge – are viewed as coalitions in
this latter paper.
Moreover, as the information communication and technology revolution dramati-
cally expanded the possibilities of this kind of distributed coordination and networked
innovation, a tendency towards open development of technological knowledge took
wing. Indeed, the functioning of large-scale digital networks highlights the prominent
role played by voluntary contributions to the production and management of pools
of intangible research resources, such as open source software or large-scale genomic
databases. This is especially true in the early stages of research along the innovation
and product-development chain, when access to multiple upstream inputs – including
materials, literature and data – amongst a large number of decentralized contributors
to the research process is essential (Reichman et al. 2016). Also, direct public avail-
ability of research results and innovations has proven to provide major socio-economic
benefits for society.2 As a result, a new type of good, namely public knowledge goods,
has emerged in almost all scholarly disciplines and knowledge contexts (Reichman and
Uhlir 2003; Benkler 2006). In general, these particular public goods, such as tech-
nological knowledge, have been defined as goods with non-exclusive access and use
conditions, which are widely consumed by various communities or individuals (Hess
and Ostrom 2007).
In this paper, we study the process of voluntary coalition-building geared towards
the development and dissemination of public knowledge goods.3 Traditionally, the
economic literature has mainly focused on the production of public knowledge goods
by governmental institutions, whilst less attention was given to the theoretical ba-
sis of public knowledge goods produced by individual agents contributing voluntarily
to communities, such as open source software communities or research exchange net-
works. As a result, and despite a large body of empirical research which has shown the
effectiveness of voluntary mechanisms for the production of public knowledge goods,4
the exact ways in which coalitions can overcome the initial free-rider problem un-
dermining technological development are as yet not fully clear. As we will argue, the
group-based benefits to knowledge creation which are interlinked with the cooperative,
joint process of networked innovation, will play a crucial part in this process.
In short, we approach the process of networked innovation from the point of view
of public good theory, where two important features of successful economic and in-
stitutional cooperative arrangements stand out. Moreover, and even though both of
these features – which we describe in detail below – would apply to a broad set of
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voluntary pooled public knowledge goods, we focus on one of the most well studied
and prominent cases to illustrate and rationalise our findings: open source software
development.
First of all, the importance of reaching an adequate group size for knowledge gen-
eration to proceed – often highlighted in public good theory as a necessary condition
for voluntary cooperation – also materialises in the open source context. Indeed, as
shown in a recent large-scale survey by Schweik and English (2012), the formation of
coalitions with a certain minimum size is needed for software developers to effectively
pool their efforts and contributions. In other words, only if the aggregate level of the
produced public good is high enough – through attracting a sufficient number of con-
tributors with appropriate expertise for selected tasks – will developers be motivated
to voluntarily contribute to the development of a project. Furthermore, when such a
minimum coalition size is reached, this size will theoretically also be the equilibrium
size. Since other agents can free-ride on the public good once it is produced, there is
no economic incentive for them to join the contributors’ group. This duality between
the core group of user-developers on the one hand and the broader user group on the
other, is a well-known pattern that is observed in open source development projects as
well (Raymond 1999). In these projects, the group of user-developers grows until the
group-size is sufficient for the task at hand, as also described above, while the broader
group of software users continues to grow beyond that size.5
Second, private benefits to knowledge production often influence the willingness of
agents to participate in a cooperative process. In the context of open source devel-
opment, Hippel and Krogh (2003) show that public knowledge generation in effect
brings about both aggregate public and non-market, private benefits for developers.
The latter private benefits then include problem solving, learning and enjoyment,
higher citations for researchers through increased visibility, or access to new personal
competencies by joining a community with high-level expertise. As a consequence, de-
velopers contributing to public knowledge pools will logically be driven by both the
public as well as the private benefits of knowledge production.6 It is precisely this lat-
ter feature of public good theory which we will extend in what follows, by considering
the kind of social preferences that are specifically related to the cooperative nature
of networked innovation. Allowing for social preferences which can interact with the
public and private benefits described above, thus provides our model with its novel
feature.7
Indeed, the role of public and private benefits when group-related social preferences
also affect agents’ willingness to join a coalition producing public goods, remains unad-
dressed in the literature. Public knowledge good development is no exception in this
respect, yet there are good reasons to believe that social preferences are an impor-
tant driver alongside the purely private and public benefits of networked innovation
(Dedeurwaerdere et al. 2016). As shown by Dalle and David (2008) in the particu-
lar case of open source development for example, reaching a ‘quasi-stable’ stage of a
community of contributors generating an evolving code-base, is best explained by the
joint involvement of several classes of participants with different mixes of privately and
socially motivated agents. In three of these classes social preferences play an explicit
role, where developers are either driven by peer esteem (so-called ‘kudos’ seekers),
group related learning opportunities (so-called social interaction seekers), or both. In
other words, when group approval or group belonging are important to agents, private
benefits of knowledge production can transcend the purely individual level studied in
earlier work,8 and also interact with a group-based dimension. In short, we believe
that the process of coalition formation in networked innovation systems also depends
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on the characteristics of the network’s members, which are to a large degree given by
their various group-based preferences.9
To study the role of social preferences in this context, we develop a theoretical
model of coalition-building in networked innovation systems aimed at technological
knowledge production. Also, and as far as we can tell, we are the first to investigate
the effect of group-based social preferences on this kind of bargaining processes set
to overcome social dilemmas. Our approach draws on the private-collective incentive
theory of Hippel and Krogh (2003), developed within the wider context of “user-based
innovation”. We then complement this perspective by building on the theory of group-
related internal motivations, as well as the social psychology literature analysing social
preferences, extra-role behaviour and organisational citizenship behavior (LePine et al.
2002). Our main finding is that the private benefits of public knowledge production
can have contrasting effects on coalition formation. First, and in line with earlier work,
private benefits bring about smaller coalitions since the public benefits of knowledge
are needed less to overcome its production costs. However, and especially when group
approval is more important to developers, larger private benefits – such as private
learning and enjoyment, higher citations, increased visibility, or improved competence
– can lead to bigger coalitions as well. In this case cooperation in networked innovation
systems is perceived more as purely self-interested rather than as a contribution to
society, with the result that knowledge production is considered less of an achievement
by other developers. Consequently, and given a developer’s sensitivity to the approval
of his coalition members, larger public benefits produced by a bigger coalition are
needed. This precisely to compensate for the reputational losses suffered by developers
which enjoy large private benefits, but find group approval important.
In other words, whether a coalition is made up out of developers deriving large pri-
vate gains from peer-approved knowledge production – such as the ‘hackers’ discussed
further on – or exhibit social preferences for contributing to the group’s social identity
– such as the ‘social learners’ introduced below – makes a difference in terms of stable
coalition size. Also, as the group-based social preferences become more pronounced
across the board, joining the coalition simply becomes too alluring for non-members.
Developers then rally around ever higher group-induced welfare levels, up to the point
that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition.
Lastly, we study a population composed of multiple developer types, each with
different social preferences. We show that, in line with earlier findings by Dalle and
David (2008), smaller groups with homogeneous social preferences can overcome the
social dilemma by broadening their base. This results in larger, more heterogeneously
composed coalitions, made up out of diverse sub-groups.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the basic motiva-
tion of our analysis and elaborates on the supporting literature. Section 3 theoreti-
cally analyses how social dilemmas of public knowledge production can be overcome
through coalition formation in a private-collective model, allowing for social prefer-
ences. In Section 4 we present an application of the model assuming heterogeneous
social preferences. Section 5 concludes.
2. Motivation
To fully grasp the predictions of our theoretical model introduced below, we first look
at the personal attributes and behavioral patterns of real-life open-source software de-
velopers. The extensive survey data on socio-psychological motivations in this specific
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field allows us to illustrate how the interplay of social preferences and private bene-
fits can influence the process of coalition formation in networked innovation systems,
aimed at the generation of public knowledge goods. As in Dahlander and McKelvey
(2005), the scope of our model goes beyond existing developer groups, and considers
every researcher/innovator with the skills to potentially contribute to a networked
innovation system such as a digital development process. The more general question
then becomes why the latter would join such a networked coalition of developers to
begin with, which determines the stable coalition size.
2.1. The Case of FLOSS Developers
The FLOSS-US 2003 survey is a web-based survey, generating a wealth of data on
motivations and reasons for developers to begin to work on Free/Libre, Open Source
Software (FLOSS) projects (David and Shapiro 2008). Using this data, David and
Shapiro (2008) classify the respondents according to their distinct motivational pro-
files by hierarchical cluster analysis (see figure B.1 in appendix). In addition, when-
ever possible, the respondents in each cluster are also matched to projects of known
membership sizes, revealing that the fractions of respondents from each motivational
cluster for the large and the very small project ranges are different (see figure B.2 in
appendix). Now, two major outcomes from this study cannot readily be explained in
a model without social preferences.
The first point is related to the contrasting effects of social preferences on coalition
formation, specifically in the case of low versus high direct private returns for the
members of the coalition. As can be seen from the study of David and Shapiro (see
figure B.2 in appendix), the three clusters where group-based social preferences are
at work – the “social learners”, “social programmers” and “user/innovators” – are
present both in the small and large ranges of the project sizes. Stable coalitions of the
smaller and larger kind are thus equally spread, and this compared to other clusters
which are only present in the large ranges. This is consistent with the intuition that
group belonging and peer approval foster cooperation in situations of social dilemma.
In contrast, the cluster of “aspiring hackers”, which is composed of “[. . . ] individualist,
materially motivated programmers, which take part in FLOSS in the interest of a future
career” (David and Shapiro 2008), is more present in the large-size groups than in the
small-size groups. For hackers, the willingness to join a coalition depends more on the
purely private benefits from knowledge production – such as job market signaling and
human capital accumulation – rather than group-based social benefits (Lakhani and
Wolf 2003; Raymond 1999). The question then becomes why these aspiring hackers
participate more in the larger projects, whilst the literature on coalition formation
would predict the exact opposite outcome given the sizeable private benefits from
contributing. Our model provides some intuition here.
The second point concerns the formation of heterogeneous coalitions to overcome
social dilemmas, when homogeneous groups are too small to form viable coalitions.
Figure B.3 in appendix gives the matrix for developers’ movements among projects of
different membership size. In reading these data, it is reasonable to assume that on
average developers in their first project derive higher personal learning and problem
solving benefits, i.e. higher direct private benefits, compared to the involvement of
these same persons in their second and/or most recent project (David and Shapiro
2008). As a result, and on average, developers in second stage projects show a higher
probability to go to larger FLOSS projects to compensate for the loss in private ben-
5
efits, since the individual marginal return on the aggregate public good will be higher
in larger projects.
In particular, this result is valid both for agents that were involved in the first stage
in small groups, which are likely to be homogeneous, or in medium groups, which
include both homogeneous and heterogeneous cases. The first case corresponds to ho-
mogeneous groups that extend to heterogeneous groups to reach the stable coalition
size, which we will explicitly model in section 4 below. The second case corresponds
to the increase in optimum group size for heterogeneous coalitions, where the private
return component of the contribution to the public good is also decreasing. Either
way, the interpretation so far coincides well with the literature on coalition formation:
smaller private benefits imply larger coalitions. However, a certain amount of develop-
ers in the FLOSS database continues to work on projects of equal, or even smaller size
as well. Also here, our model offers an explanation, further rationalising the process
of mixed coalition formation.
In short, our model will frame most of these – often seemingly contrasting – dy-
namics and pinpoint where the private benefits of knowledge production and social
preferences can interact. This to provide a fresh perspective on how networked inno-
vations take shape in a private-collective setting.
2.2. Supporting Literature
Whilst a large theoretical literature has studied endogenous coalition formation among
countries grappling with global environmental problems,10 or among research units
seeking competitive funding,11 we focus on voluntary contribution to public goods pro-
duction.12 As pointed out in the introduction, and adding to this latter public goods
perspective on coalition formation, we focus on public knowledge production in the
context of networked innovation systems. From the seminal works of Arrow (1962) and
Stiglitz (1999), the global public good character of scientific and technological knowl-
edge has already been largely analysed in the public economic literature. Following
the latter, we consider a situation where innovators, such as software developers, face
a social dilemma so that – as is the standard initial position in any public good game
– their dominant strategy will be non-contribution to the production of the public
knowledge good. The aim of the model is then to investigate how social preferences
influence the bargaining process shaping eventual coalitions, which are set to overcome
this social dilemma.
To allow for social preferences, we draw on the private-collective incentive theory
developed by Hippel and Krogh (2003). In line with their extensive case study research,
we assume that ‘[. . . ] contributors to a public good can inherently obtain private ben-
efits that are tied to the development of that good. These benefits are available only
to project contributors and not to free riders and represent a form of selective incen-
tives for project participation that need not be managed by collective action project
personnel‘ (Hippel and Krogh 2003).
This approach chimes well with the general theory of joint products proposed by
Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1994), and further developed by Kotchen (2006, 2009) and
Vicary (1997, 2000). One of the main contributions here, is that free-riding over other
agents’ contribution to public goods decreases when these same goods also provide con-
tributors with private benefits.13 Now, by introducing evidence from social psychology
on the role of group behavior, we extend the scope of these private benefits beyond
the purely individual frontier, and thus explore their interaction with group-based so-
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cial preferences. What is more, since the benefits deriving from such preferences are
group-related, they will be conditional on coalition-membership.
The literature in social psychology highlights two key dimensions of social pref-
erences that play a prominent role in group behavior: group identity related to the
collective goals realised by a group or community, and peer approval of pro-social
attitudes. First, studies provide compelling evidence that the longing for a positive
social group identity is a key determinant of engagement in group behavior. Social
psychological experiments have shown that social group identity is even in many cases
the most important explanatory factor to account for various types of group related
motivations such as procedural justice, fairness and supervisor ratings (Blader and
Tyler 2009; Wit and Kerr 2002). The second type of social preference that plays an
important role in group engagement is the social approval for individual pro-social
attitudes and behavior (LePine et al. 2002). These individual pro-social reputation ef-
fects have also been studied extensively in the context of overcoming social dilemmas
(Suurmond et al. 2004; Bolton et al. 2005).
Lastly, especially this latter dimension of reputation effects is reminiscent of the
social exchange approach modelled by Holla¨nder (1990), where voluntary cooperative
behavior is assumed to be motivated by social approval. This approval is conceptu-
alised as an emotional activity of appreciations: emotions, feelings, but also verbal
expressions are in this sense modelled as having a stimulus power s(b), prompting
emotional reactions that measure the subjective value of cooperative behavior b. We
will follow a similar approach in what follows, using linear relationships for simplicity.
3. The Model
Consider a community of n > 2 developers interacting in a common environment,
potentially pooling their efforts in networked innovation systems to produce a certain
amount of public knowledge goods, such as technological knowledge, expressed by qi
for each developer i. To model the decision-making driving this innovation process,
we follow the approach pioneered by Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) or
Barrett (1994), which boils down to modelling two stages under perfect and complete
information. A ‘contribution’ public good game in the second stage, where each devel-
oper decides how much to contribute to the public knowledge good, is preceded by a
‘membership’ game in the first stage, defining coalition formation. The latter should be
seen as an announcement game where, by taking into account the behaviour of others,
a developer either announces to team up with colleagues in a coalition, or not.14 We
furthermore assume only one coalition can be formed, so that developers who are not
joining this coalition are assumed to act as singletons. This is a standard assumption in
the economic literature on climate agreement negotiations,15 and chimes well with the
context of voluntary networked innovation, usually clustered around the development
of one specific application or idea.
Working towards a subgame perfect equilibrium, we start out with the contribu-
tion game in the second stage in what follows, taking the strategic combinations of
cooperation decided on in the first stage as given.
3.1. Contribution Game
Depending on whether a coalition of s members (s = |S|) is formed in the preceding
membership game, and whether developer i is a member of this coalition, his utility
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is defined by
ui =
{
b
∑n
j qj − cqi + αbqi if i /∈ S or if S = ∅
b
∑n
j qj − cqi + αbqi + qi (β + (b− αb)θ) if i ∈ S
(1)
where the public good character of the benefits to overall knowledge production b
∑n
j qj
depends on total production
∑n
j qj , and the unit cost of production is given by c > 0.
The purely private, ‘ancillary’ benefits derived from knowledge production – such
as problem solving, learning, increased visibility or access to expertise – are then
denoted by αbqi, with α > 0 measuring the weight which ancillary benefits receive in
developer welfare. For simplicity and mathematical convenience, and following Finus
and Ru¨bbelke (2013), we have thus implicitly assumed the same functional form for
primary benefits and ancillary benefits, namely f(qi) = bqi, with b > 0 the marginal
benefit of producing the knowledge good. For similar reasons, we assume developers
are ex-ante symmetric, i.e. they all share the same utility function. However, depending
on whether they join the coalition or not, they may enjoy different levels of welfare
ex-post.
This latter point becomes clear when considering the group-related social benefits
we mentioned above, which accrue only to developers working in a coalition producing
technological innovation. The sense of ‘belonging’ to a larger group striving to achieve
the same goals, which we defined above as contributing to the group identity, is given
by β > 0 in (1). The degree to which fellow coalition members appreciate individual
contributions to this group effort, what we called pro-social reputation building above,
is marked by θ > 0. The larger the divide between the marginal ‘social’ benefit of
production b and the purely individual benefit captured by αb, the more an individual
contribution is perceived as an achievement by group members. Reputation effects of
this kind are also modelled by Holla¨nder (1990) as mentioned earlier, where voluntary
cooperative behavior is assumed to be motivated by social approval. This approval is
conceptualised as an emotional activity of appreciations: emotions, feelings, but also
verbal expressions of group members prompt reactions that measure the subjective
value of cooperatively developing public knowledge, i.e. as a function of b− αb.16
We can now go over the possible outcomes of the game, given every possible strate-
gic combination decided on in the membership game taking place in the first stage.
Assume first that all developers play simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The Nash
equilibrium is then derived by computing the fixed point of the developers’ best re-
sponse correspondence, yielding a unique payoff vector uo = u(qo).17 Instead, when
developers decide to produce the knowledge good by forming a coalition, we assume
a bargaining process works towards the Pareto optimal outcome. This process may
result in a coalition of s members, where s goes from 2 to n, in which case the grand
coalition forms. The cooperative outcome of this game is given by the Nash bargaining
solution,18 with the non-cooperative equilibrium pay-off vector uo = (u(qo1)...u(q
o
n)) as
the threat point of the bargaining process.19
Following Kolstad (2007) or Finus and Ru¨bbelke (2013) – and without loss of gen-
erality – we normalise the strategy space to qi  (0, 1) so that there are essentially only
two possible strategies for each developer i to play: ‘produce knowledge’ (qi = 1) or
not (qi = 0). Now, to model a social dilemma, we assume the social optimum where
everyone works together is different from the non-cooperative equilibrium, and impose
the following two assumptions.
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Assumption 1. When all developers cooperate, a sufficient condition for knowledge
production (qi = 1) to be an equilibrium choice in the grand coalition is given by
nb+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ 0. (2)
In other words, assumption 1 makes production profitable if all developers cooperate
in the grand coalition. To arrive at a social dilemma, the opposite will have to be true
when developers do not cooperate.
Assumption 2. For developers not to contribute (qi = 0) in the non-cooperative
Nash-equilibrium, we need that
b+ αb− c < 0. (3)
Combining both assumptions, we arrive at the typical prisoner’s dilemma outcome:
production pays from a global, social perspective but not from an individual one. The
question then becomes whether developers will choose to cooperate to overcome this
social dilemma. We investigate the stability of such a coalition in the next section.
3.2. Membership Game: Stability and Profitability of Coalitions
Each individual developer considers the possible choices (cooperative or non-
cooperative) of his counterparts, and his subsequent outcomes defined in the con-
tribution game. A coalition of s members can then only form if technology production
pays off, i.e. if the benefits of each contributing member uMi outmatch the payoffs un-
der the non-cooperative outcome given by uo. This kind of profitability is guaranteed
by
uMi = sb+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ u(qoi ) = 0, (4)
where, because of (3), non-cooperative developers set an equilibrium production choice
of qi = 0, and derive zero utility as a result.
Naturally, the fact that cooperative knowledge production is profitable, is only a
minimum requirement for any coalition to form. The main issue undermining coalition-
formation is free-riding by non-producers. Here, developers have the incentive to let
others form the coalition but share in its produce, without contributing themselves. A
coalition will by consequence only form if it is both
Internally stable: uMi (s) ≥ uNMi (s− 1) ∀i ∈ S, (5)
and
Externally stable: uNMi (s) > u
M
i (s+ 1) ∀i /∈ S, (6)
where S again denotes the set of coalition members, and where we assume that if a
developer is indifferent between joining the coalition or staying outside, she will join.
This notion of stability draws on the oligopoly literature, where a cartel is defined
as stable when there are no incentives for any individual members to leave nor any
outsiders to join (d’Aspremont et al. 1983).20 In this sense, when a coalition s is
internally stable, then coalition s − 1 is externally instable as outsiders will want to
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join. On the other hand, if that same coalition s is externally stable, then coalition
s+ 1 will be internally unstable since coalition members will want to leave.
Employing the notion of stability given by (5) and (6), we can now verify whether
a coalition formed in our setup would be stable. Doing so, we first define the following
assumption on the group-based preference structure.
Assumption 3. The group-based social preferences expressed by β and θ in (1) are
such that
b+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) < 0. (7)
Since we know from (3) that b + αb − c < 0, this assumption implies that social
preferences will be less pronounced than the individual preferences for the knowledge
good itself, captured by the public and private benefits of production, b and αb respec-
tively. The latter assumption is then used in appendix to prove proposition 1 below,
summarising our main stability result.
Proposition 1. If the social benefits of cooperating in group are not too pronounced,
so that assumption 1 holds, a stable coalition of s∗ < n members forms. Its break-even
point of profitability is given by
s∗ =
1
γ
− α−
(
β
b
+ (1− α)θ
)
, (8)
with γ = b/c. If group-based benefits are larger, and assumption 1 is violated, the grand
coalition forms.
What the proposition shows, is that when social preferences are less pronounced
than the preference for the knowledge good itself -as well as for the private benefits αb
deriving from it- a stable coalition of size s∗ < n will form. In this case, proposition
1 predicts that higher public benefits of public knowledge measured in terms of costs
of production bc (= γ), lead to smaller coalition sizes. Because of the widening gap
between benefits and costs, less developers are needed to make cooperative production
profitable. A standard result in the literature.
Contrary to a model omitting social preferences however, the effect of the pri-
vate benefits αbqi are ambiguous here. On the one hand, the private benefits bring
about smaller coalitions since public benefits of knowledge b
∑n
j qj are needed less to
overcome production costs. On the other hand, when group approval of individual
achievements expressed by θ is important (θ > 1), a larger weight α leads to larger
coalitions ceteris paribus. Here then, since cooperation is perceived as being based
more on self-interest than on altruistic motives, the larger private gains undercut the
extent to which knowledge production is considered by peers as a social achievement.
Public benefits from technological knowledge will in this latter case be needed more
to uphold developer welfare, resulting in larger coalitions. However, more pronounced
preferences for group identity building, captured by β, will mitigate this effect.
In other words, if developers incur considerable private gains from public knowledge
production in networked innovation systems, and find peer approval to be important,
our model predicts larger coalitions. This coincides with the larger presence of the
“aspiring hackers” in the bigger projects of the FLOSS data described earlier (see
figure B.2 in appendix), since hackers in general are considered to have a lot to gain
individually, but care less for group belonging or identity than they do for peer ap-
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preciation (David and Shapiro 2008). Indeed, Lerner and Tirole (2002) consider the
participation of hackers as driven by the clear objective to create an external repu-
tation of their expertise. Dalle and David (2008) reach a similar conclusion regarding
the category of social hackers, drawn by the community recognition and esteem of
technically challenging tasks. Conversely, when coalition members also exhibit strong
social preferences favouring group identity building, such as the social programmers or
learners in the FLOSS database, smaller coalitions are more likely to form alongside
bigger ones, depending on the importance attached to peer approval and the size of
the private gains.
Lastly, when group based preferences are large enough to switch around condition
(3), joining the coalition simply becomes too alluring for all non-members. In this case,
more and more non-members would want to join the coalition and enjoy the individual
and group-based benefits. This process continues until every single developer has joined
the coalition and the grand coalition forms, so that s∗ = n.
4. Heterogeneous Social Preferences
Importantly, and even when group-based preferences are such that assumption 1 holds,
a stable coalition of s∗ members – as defined in proposition 1 – will not form if the
community in question lacks the numbers, so that s∗ > n. In this case, the question be-
comes whether a larger, yet inevitably more heterogeneous community could overcome
the social dilemma instead.
Studying the FLOSS survey data given in figure B.3 in appendix, such a process
may indeed be taking place. Engaged in their first projects, groups are often smaller
and more homogeneous as well as enjoying larger direct private benefits αbqj , since the
learning curve will be at its steepest at this point and leads to a higher weight α. Follow-
up projects on the other hand mostly expand in size, suggesting that lower private
benefits are compensated by forming larger coalitions. However, and importantly, such
larger groups have in all likelihood also gained in diversity and heterogeneity. To
study these dynamics, we introduce a heterogeneous community in what follows, where
developers can differ in terms of their preferences for group belonging β, as well as
reputation building θ.
To fix ideas, let us first suppose a coalition of s members forms for a start-up
project out of a community of n identical developers. Suppose also that assumption 1
holds, in which case s = s∗ < n. Then assume that, by moving from the first to the
next projects, the weight of private appreciation α goes down considerably because, as
described above, the learning curve starts to level off. Now, whether this results in the
coalition breaking up because its required size characterised by proposition 1 is larger
than the community size itself, also depends on social preferences. If developers are
highly sensitive to the kind of group approval captured by θ, we learn from proposition
1 that this mitigates the increase in required coalition size s∗. Indeed, if θ > 1, the
required coalition size would even go down ceteris paribus. As α drops going from
the first to the follow-up projects, producing public knowledge is valued as more of a
social achievement by peers so that what a smaller coalition loses in terms of produced
public knowledge b
∑n
j qj , it gains in group approval. Even though they represent a
minority in the FLOSS database, this would explain why there are groups that stick
to their initial size in follow-up projects in figure B.3 (if θ = 1), or have their numbers
shrink (if θ > 1).
Inversely, if peer effects and group approval play a smaller part in developer welfare
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so that θ < 1, the required coalition size is more likely to exceed the community’s size
after a considerable drop in α, leading to a situation where s∗ > n. But does this mean
all further cooperation is ruled out? As mentioned above, The FLOSS data in figure
B.3 point in the opposite direction, as cooperation in a majority of cases takes on
larger forms in larger coalitions for follow-up projects. Indeed, other communities may
join the ranks of our first community, which would come out reinforced as a result.
The only remaining question is then whether such heterogeneous, merged communities
can support stable coalitions. We investigate in what follows.
Assume a first community of n1 developers has stronger social preferences for group
belonging β than for group approval θ so that θ < β < 1, where the latter inequality is
in line with the intuition underpinning assumption 1. Applying (5), internal stability
is then established if for each member of the coalition we have that
uM1i (s1) = s1b+ αb− c+
(
β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ 0 = uNM1i (s1 − 1). (9)
Now consider a second community which, for the sake of simplicity, has exactly the
opposite preferences as compared to the first community, so that θ = β and θ = β.
Internal stability for this second community then requires that
uM2i (s2) = s2b+ αb− c+
(
β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ 0 = uNM2i (s2 − 1). (10)
Following proposition 1, both (9) and (10) implicitly define the stable coalition size
for each community respectively. Next, we assume these are such that s∗2 > n2 and
s∗1 > n1 after completion of a start-up project. This reflects a considerable decrease of
α moving towards follow-up or second projects, where the flattening of the learning
curve again requires larger public benefits to compensate for smaller private benefits,
and thus brings about larger coalitions since we have assumed above that θ < 1.
Assuming furthermore that the parameter values of our model implied that s∗1 = s∗2
during the start-up project, we know from proposition 1 that s∗1 > s∗2 after the drop
in α, since θ > θ. Suppose now that both communities decide to merge for a follow-up
project, so that n = n1 + n2. The stable coalition would then be characterised by
s∗ = s∗1 =
c− αb− (β + (b− αb)θ)
b
, (11)
if, of course, s∗ < n. Logically, s∗ yields an internally as well as externally stable
coalition for the community counting n1 developers, since (11) follows from (9). For
the second community on the other hand, a smaller coalition size s∗2 defined by (10),
would already have ensured stability. However, in our merged setting a coalition of
size s∗ given by (11) is internally stable for this second community as well, since for
all coalition members of this community we have that
uM2i (s
∗) = s∗b+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ 0 = uNM2i (s∗ − 1), (12)
where the last equality, uNM2i (s
∗ − 1) = 0 holds for the simple reason that at size
(s∗ − 1), coalition members hailing from our first community with n1 developers will
defect without exception. Under complete and perfect information, the n2 developers of
the second community take this potential breakdown of cooperation into account, and
act accordingly by contributing. Lastly, because s∗1 > s∗2, the coalition characterised by
12
(11) will also be externally stable with respect to developers of this second community.
We generalise these findings in proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let s∗1 and s∗2 be the stable coalition sizes emerging from two commu-
nities of developers, which are different in terms of social preferences so that s∗1 > s∗2.
Furthermore, assume both communities are insufficiently large for the coalitions to
form separately, so that s∗1 > n1 and s∗2 > n2. The merged community n = n1 + n2
then gives rise to:
(1) A stable coalition of size s∗ = s∗1, if n ≥ s∗1
(2) Non-cooperation if n < s∗1
To put our findings in more general terms, proposition 2 predicts that mixed coali-
tions of heterogeneous agents will be stable, even when smaller, more homogeneous
coalitions fail to form. Consequently, smaller groups with homogeneous preferences can
overcome the social dilemma by broadening their base, resulting in larger coalitions
made up out of diverse sub-groups.
Lastly, we can show under which conditions proposition 2 carries over to a set-
ting where assumption 1 does not hold, in which case we would start off with grand
coalitions. Suppose assumption 1 does not hold for both communities, because of very
pronounced group-based social preferences. We then get
b+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ 0. (13)
In this case s∗1 = n1 and s∗2 = n2, and the only stable coalitions would be the grand
coalitions. Any difference between the heterogeneous communities at this point, would
derive strictly from differences in community size n.
As soon as private benefits α decrease after the first start-up projects however, (13)
could tilt the other way if θ > 1. In this case, the stable coalition size will no longer
be equal to the community size, and the question becomes whether
s∗1 ≶ n1 and s∗2 ≶ n2. (14)
If the required coalition size for follow-up projects exceeds the community size in both
cases, which is the premise for proposition 2, we are back in the situation we described
before. Of course, in the opposite case coalition sizes would actually shrink in follow-
up projects. This would then further rationalise the remaining follow-up flows coming
out of the FLOSS data. The same goes for a setting where θ ≤ 1 and (13) continues
to hold if α decreases, in which case the coalition size remains unchanged going from
one project to another.
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5. Conclusion
This paper has concentrated on the process of production and dissemination of public
knowledge goods in the context of technological innovation generated by coalitions
of innovators in networked innovation systems. In particular, we have analysed the
ambiguity of private non-market benefits in fostering coalition formation to produce
publicly available technological knowledge used in collaborative scientific research,
such as open source software or large-scale public databases, which play an important
role in contemporary life science research and innovation. Such private benefits to
individual innovators contributing to these intangible research assets are considered
as an important driver for the proliferation of pooled knowledge goods in distributed
innovation networks. Private benefits to contributors that have been partially studied
in the literature are of two kinds: (1) direct private benefits such as individual problem
solving or higher citation rates for researchers; (2) satisfaction of social preferences such
as group belonging, group identity, pro-social individual reputation and status.
In the current literature on coalition formation for public good provision, the ef-
fect of these two kinds of benefits tied in knowledge production is mostly considered
to bring about smaller, stable coalition sizes. No theoretical explanation of the fact
that, in some cases, the increase in focus on private non-market benefits to individ-
ual scientists lead to smaller coalitions and, in some cases, to larger ones is provided
in the literature. To build a more general model, this paper integrated the theory
of public goods and a social psychological model of group related social preferences
into coalition theory. This allowed us to show the contrasted effects of social group
identity and social approval/disapproval of individual pro-social attitudes on the coali-
tion formation in networked innovation systems. The presence of agents giving high
value to their individual pro-social reputation within a social network can make larger
coalitions necessary in order to keep coalition formation stable.
Even though we used a dataset from open source software collaborations for testing
our model, the model is a general one and therefore the results of the analysis apply to
a broad set of voluntary pooled public knowledge goods,. This comparison shows that
the integration of social psychology in public good theory is relevant for understanding
community formation behavior in this field. In addition, the model predicts that mixed
coalitions of heterogeneous agents can be stable even when smaller, more homogeneous
coalitions fail to form. This also contains an important lesson for the building of
research collaborations in digitally networked life science research. Indeed, building
multi-purpose, more heterogeneous, networks might be essential in many cases of up-
scaling of voluntary contributed pools of intangible knowledge assets. The latter is also
corroborated by the literature on the importance of bridging social capital and the role
of knowledge brokers in large-scale science networks (Tortoriello et al. (2012); Phelps
et al. (2012)). However, additional empirical research is needed to further corroborate
this finding.
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Notes
1We also refer to Swan and Scarbrough (2005), for an exhaustive literature review on networked innovation.
2As shown by Harison and Cowan (2004), open-source software projects have also become relevant to firms
in the sense that a certain degree of disclosure of development processes can boost profit-margins when revenues
are responsive to this kind of ‘openness’.
3David and Keely (2003) e.g., use the same definition of coalition-building (“network” formation) used in
our paper. However, they model the process of coalition formation among research units that seek competitive
funding from a supra-regional program, rather than developing new technology.
4 See e.g. Lessig (2001), Benkler (2006), Hess et al. (2008), or David (2008).
5The latter however does not imply that the core group of developers remains invariably composed of the
exact same people over time, as shown by Dalle and David (2008) in a simulation model of large-scale open
source software projects. Because of this ‘turnover’ of developers, the core group is more accurately described
as a ‘quasi-stable’ community of agents, which nonetheless always has the appropriate size to intervene in the
accessible parts of the code-base requiring further development.
6As has been shown elsewhere, this joint public/private character can have different effects on contributions.
If the private benefit has a market substitute, the joint character can undermine the willingness to contribute
to the public good in situations where the market price of the substitute is sufficiently low (Cornes and Sandler
1984). See also Andreoni (1988), Kotchen (2006, 2009) and Vicary (1997, 2000) for opposite effects in the
absence of market substitutes.
7More generally, the private benefits to voluntary cooperation in this context are emphasised in many
other studies of public knowledge goods. One can think for example of open access databases with tailor-made
data management tools that benefit specific communities and individuals (David 2005), or hybrid funding
arrangements – including both market and non-market tools – for openly available culture products on the
internet (Lessig 2008).
8This individual level need not be purely self-interested in the negative sense of the word, but can also have
an altruistic quality. See e.g. Ga¨chter et al. (2010) and Garriga et al. (2012) for a discussion on the effects of
inequality aversion, fairness and reciprocity in the private-collective context.
9Along these lines, (Benkler 2006) has found that, in mixed or complex incentive schemes, such as those
at stake in these large-scale digital collaboration networks, participants are driven more by social motivations
(especially reputational benefits) and intrinsic motivations (such as ethics, curiosity, and other personal values)
than by the prospect of direct monetary rewards alone. In the life sciences, where potential commercial rewards
from basic research are always a factor, especially with regard to university-driven research, Allarakhia found
that the reciprocity benefits to be gained from participation in research consortia, are often the key motivational
factor (Allarakhia et al. 2010).
10Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) or Barrett (1994) laid the groundwork here, followed by e.g.
Barrett (2003), Ulph (2004) or Kolstad (2007). Finus (2008) or Hovi et al. (2015) provide a survey of this large
body of literature.
11David and Keely (2003) evaluate alternative possible external public R&D funding rules to determine the
impact on coalition formation.
12See e.g. also Kosfeld et al. (2009) or McEvoy (2010) on this issue.
13In Sandler and Arce (2007), such impure public good production is set in the context of international
development cooperation. Here, donor countries can also derive private benefits – e.g. through the sale of
technology – in addition to the global public good benefits related to the increase in economic development
and poverty alleviation. Finus and Ru¨bbelke (2013) go on to study such ‘ancillary benefits’ of public good
provision in a setting of international environmental agreements.
14A Nash equilibrium in this membership game is therefore a set of announcements for which no developer
will do better by unilaterally changing his or her announcement.
15See e.g. Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994) or Kolstad (2007). For the implications
of the formation of multiple coalitions, see Carraro (2003), or Hovi et al. (2015) for a discussion.
16Note furthermore that under the current specification it is possible for private benefits to outweigh public
benefits, to the extent that the reputation effect becomes negative if α > 1 in (1). Comparing both equations in
(1), developer welfare could consequently be lower when producing inside the coalition as opposed to outside,
given certain parameter values. However, since we have modeled the game in such a way that it never pays for
developers to produce public knowledge outside of the coalition, this possibility does not affect our equilibrium
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results. Indeed, if the coalition is profitable and internally stable – as defined in section 3.2 and resulting
from assumptions 2 and 3, and expression (4) – no developer j inside the coalition will have the incentive to
leave, whilst no developer i outside of the coalition will want to produce on his own. The situation where e.g.
ui =
∑s
j qj − cqi + αbqi thus never presents itself. In subgame perfect equilibrium, welfare for developers i
outside of the stable coalition is simply ui =
∑s−i
j qj , and will always be larger than welfare inside the coalition
because of the internal and external stability implicitly imposed by assumption 3. If one coalition member were
to leave the stable coalition to reap these higher benefits however, cooperation breaks down and overall welfare
would be zero. See also footnote 19 on the importance of the threat point to micro-found such an outcome in
a non-cooperative setting.
17By construction of our finite strategy game, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium will be unique. With
R(q) = {qˆ = (qˆ1...qˆn)} the vector correspondence of best responses to the strategy profile q = (q1...qn) – where
qˆi is a best response to (q1, ...qi−1, qi+1, ..., qn) for each i – and given that R(q) is upper semi-continuous and
convex-valued, we know by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem there is some qo ∈ R(q). Given assumption 2, we
also know this equilibrium strategy profile is unique.
18This assumption is not essential, any bargaining solution in the literature would deliver similar results.
19As is well known, an outcome under axiomatic Nash bargaining is liable to suppress many details of
the decision making process. In order to rationalise such an outcome using a more strategic approach, the
disagreement point is of vital importance. The seminal work of Binmore et al. (1986) for example, presents
a non-cooperative bargaining model of alternating offers which describes the bargaining process – including
initial bargaining positions and motives – explicitly. The bargaining motive identified by Binmore et al. (1986)
which arguably resonates the most with our setting of networked innovation, relates to the fear of losing the
opportunity to reach an agreement if negotiations are drawn out for too long. In this line of reasoning, the
threat point can be thought of in its literal sense: in the event of a breakdown of the bargaining process the
opportunity developers jointly strive to exploit will be lost, as not a single developer will produce. The threat
of breakdown could for example come from another network of developers reaching an agreement sooner, thus
gaining first-mover advantage whilst developers of the first community are still bargaining.
20Building on d’Aspremont et al. (1983), Donsimoni et al. (1986) shows that stable coalitions exist under fairly
general conditions. Alternative notions of stability leading to potentially larger coalitions, such as ‘farsighted
stability’, are considered by Osmani and Tol (2009) and in Carraro (2003).
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Appendix A. Proof of proposition 1
First, suppose one coalition member leaves a coalition of s members formed in our
setup, and that the (s−1) members continue to produce because uMi (s−1) = (s− 1) b+
αb − c + (β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ 0 so that the free-rider receives a payoff of uNMi (s − 1) =
(s− 1) b. Now, as defined in (5), internal stability requires
uMi (s) = sb+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ (s− 1) b = uNMi (s− 1), (A1)
which boils down to
uMi (s) = b+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ 0, (A2)
and which we have ruled out under assumption 1.
We can then move on to the second case, where the (s − 1) remaining members
cease production once the free-rider leaves because uMi (s − 1) = (s− 1) b + αb − c +
(β + (b− αb)θ) < 0, with uNMi (s − 1) = 0 as a result. Internal stability now requires
that
uMi (s) = sb+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) ≥ 0 = uNMi (s− 1), (A3)
which holds by our initial condition of profitability (4), in effect rendering cooperation
profitable in the first place. As a result, it is this second case which characterises an
internally stable coalition. Setting s = s∗ in (A3) and re-working , internal stability
thus implies that
s∗ ≥ c− αb− (β + (b− αb)θ)
b
and s∗ − 1 < c− αb− (β + (b− αb)θ)
b
. (A4)
Otherwise put, s∗ is the largest integer of the relation c−αb−(β+(b−αb)θ)b , or, s
∗ =
I
(
c−αb−(β+(b−αb)θ)
b
)
. For any s > s∗, members would continue to produce after one
member left the coalition, which cannot be an equilibrium as argued above. Contrarily,
when s < s∗, members would not produce at all since production is not profitable, so
no coalition would form.
Now, in order for the same coalition to be externally stable, (6) has to apply so that
uMi (s+ 1) = (s+ 1)b+ αb− c+ (β + (b− αb)θ) < sb = uNMi (s), (A5)
where the case of an internally stable coalition of (s+1) forming initially is again ruled
out because of (7). Re-writing (A5) furthermore, we arrive at the initial condition given
by (7). Consequently, and re-working (A4), the stable break-even point of profitability
s∗ in our setup is given by
s∗ =
1
γ
− α−
(
β
b
+ (1− α)θ
)
, (A6)
where we write the marginal public benefit b of knowledge production in terms of
costs of production bc (= γ), and where we approximate I
(
c−αb−(β+(b−αb)θ)
b
)
by
c−αb−(β+(b−αb)θ)
b .
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Suppose now that social preferences are so pronounced that assumption 1 is no
longer valid. In this case, internal stability is still guaranteed for every possible coalition
s ≤ n , as (A2) would hold across the board. External stability on the other hand,
would be violated for every but one coalition: the grand coalition. Indeed, (A5) breaks
down at every coalition size s < n in this case, as more and more non-members would
want to join the coalition and enjoy the individual and group-based benefits. This
process continues until every single developer has joined the coalition. 
Appendix B. Figures: the case of FLOSS developers
Figure B1. Key characteristics of motivational clusters
Source: David and Shapiro, 2008, p. 384.
Figure B2. Distribution of small and large project participants by motivation profiles identified by cluster
analysis of FLOSS-US survey respondent
Source: David and Shapiro, 2008, p. 394.
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Figure B3. Transition matrix for developers’ movements among projects of different membership sizes
Source: David and Shapiro, 2008, p. 389.
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